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Abstract
This paper discusses two sources of ideas that inuence monetary policy makers today.
The rst is a set of analytical results that impose the rational expectations equilibrium
concept and do `intelligent design' by solving Ramsey and mechanism design problems.
The second is the adaptive learning process that taught us how to anchor the price
level with a gold standard, then how to replace the gold standard with a at currency
wanting nominal anchors. Models of out-of-equilibrium learning say that such an
adaptive evolutionary process converges to a self-conrming equilibrium (SCE). In
an SCE, a government's probability model is correct about events that occur under
the prevailing government policy, but possibly wrong about other policies. That causes
policy design mistakes absent from a rational expectations equilibrium and expands
the role of learning.
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11 Introduction
The introduction of the precious metals for the purposes of money may with
truth be considered as one of the most important steps towards the improvement
of commerce, and the arts of civilised life; but it is no less true that, with the
advancement of knowledge and science, we discover that it would be another
improvement to banish them again from the employment to which, during a less
enlightened period, they had been so advantageously applied. Ricardo (1816,
p. 65)
This essay is about some ideas and experiences that shaped Ricardo's proposal to banish
precious metals as money, and other ideas that emerged from the struggles of academic
economists and policy makers to implement and rene what they had learned from Ricardo.
I focus on two sources of prevailing ideas in macroeconomics. One is a collection of powerful
theoretical results and empirical methods described in sections 2, 3, and 4 that apply the
rational expectations equilibrium concept to estimate models and design optimal macroe-
conomic policies intelligently. The other is an adaptive evolutionary process, modelled in
section 5 and illustrated both in section 6, about ideas and events that inuenced Ricardo,
and in section 7, about struggles of the U.S. monetary authorities in the 1970s to realize the
promise for improvement held out by Ricardo.
The rational expectations equilibrium concept equates all subjective distributions with
an objective distribution. By equating subjective distributions for endogenous variables to
an equilibrium distribution implied by a model, the rational expectations hypothesis makes
agents' beliefs disappear as extra components of a theory and sets up the powerful theoretical
results and intelligent policy design exercises described in section 2. Section 3 describes
theoretical and practical reasons for equating subjective distributions to an objective one
and how it facilitates the rational expectations econometrics described in section 4.
The assumption that agents share common beliefs underpins inuential doctrines about
whether ination-unemployment dynamics can be exploited by policy makers, the time in-
1consistency of benevolent government policy, the capacity of reputation to substitute for
commitment, the incentives for one type of policy maker to emulate another, and the wis-
dom of making information public. The common beliefs assumption is especially stressed in
those modern theories of optimal macroeconomic policy that focus on how a benevolent gov-
ernment shapes expectations optimally. This intelligent design approach to macroeconomic
policy perfects an older econometric policy evaluation method that Lucas (1976) criticized
because it imputed dierent beliefs to the government and other agents.
Intelligent design is normative (`what should be') economics, but when it inuences
policy makers, it becomes positive (`what is') economics. Some researchers in the intelligent
design tradition ignore the distinction between positive and normative economics. Thus,
Barro (1979), Lucas and Stokey (1983), and Aiyagari et al. (2002) use normative theories
to understand observed time series properties of government debt and taxes. It is also
true that some policy advisors have enough faith that evolution produces good outcomes
to recommend copying best practices (for example, see Keynes (1913)). If only good things
survive the tests of time and practice, evolution produces intelligent design.
Theories of out-of-equilibrium learning tell us not always to expect that. An observational
equivalence possibility that emerges from the rational expectations econometrics of section
4 sets the stage for section 5, which describes how a system of adaptive agents converges
to a self-conrming equilibrium in which all agents have correct forecasting distributions for
events observed often along an equilibrium path, but possibly incorrect views about events
that are rarely observed. This matters because intelligent design of rational expectations
equilibria hinges on the government's expectations about events that will not be observed.
Self-conrming equilibria allow wrong models that match historical data to survive and to
inuence policy. Section 6 mentions examples from a millennium of monetary history that
culminated in the ideas expressed by Ricardo. To tell stories about the emergence of U.S.
ination in the 1970s and its conquest under Volcker and Greenspan, section 7 uses adaptive
models in which the government solves intelligent design problems with probability models
2that are misspecied, either permanently or temporarily. While these stories dier in many
interesting details, they all suggest that choices of the monetary authorities were aected
by misunderstandings that do not occur within a rational expectations equilibrium.1 These
\misspecication stories" also provide a backhanded defense for ination targeting.
2 Intelligent design with common beliefs
What I call intelligent design is to solve a Pareto problem for a model in which every agent
inside the model optimizes in light of information and incentive constraints and a common
probability model. Intelligent design is a coherent response to Lucas's (1976) indictment
of pre-rational expectations macroeconomic policy design procedures. Lucas rejected those
procedures because they incorporated private agents' decision rules that were not best re-
sponses to government policy under the equilibrium probability measure. The cross-equation
restrictions imposed by a common belief assumption x that problem.
Let f denote a probability density and xt a history xt;xt 1;:::;x0. Partition xt = [yt vt]0,
where vt is a vector of decisions taken by a government and yt is a vector of all other variables.
Let f(y1;v1j) be a joint density conditional on a parameter vector  2 
. Government
chooses a sequence h of functions
vt = ht(x
tj); t  0; (1)
to maximize a Pareto criterion that can be expressed as expected utility under density
f(x1j):
Z
U(y
1;v
1j)f(y
1;v
1j)d(y
1;v
1): (2)
Intelligent design in macroeconomics solves government programming problems (2) with
models f that impute common beliefs and best responses to all of the agents who inhabit
1These adaptive models make room for a `law of unintended consequences' cited by Friedman (1991) that
is excluded from rational expectations equilibria.
3the model. The common beliefs assumption makes parameters describing agents' beliefs
about endogenous variables disappear from .
The common beliefs assumption underlies a long list of useful results in modern macroe-
conomics. The following four have especially inuenced thinking within central banks.
1. Expected versus unexpected government actions. Lucas (1972b) drew a sharp distinc-
tion between the eects of foreseen and unforeseen monetary and scal policy actions
when the government and the public share a probability model. That idea denes the
terms in which central bankers now think about shocks and systematic policies.
2. Optimal scal and monetary policy cast as Ramsey and mechanism design problems.
A literature summarized and extended by King and Wolman (1996), Clarida et al.
(1999), and Woodford (2003) uses dynamic macroeconomic models with sticky prices
to design monetary policy rules by nding practical ways to represent and implement
solutions of Ramsey plans like (2). New dynamic models of public nance rene Ram-
sey plans by focusing on a tradeo between eciency and incentives that emerges from
the assumption that each individual privately observes his own skills and eort, a fea-
ture that imposes constraints on the allocations that a planner can implement relative
to ones he could achieve if he had more information.2
3. Time inconsistency. The availability of the rational expectations equilibrium con-
cept enabled Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Calvo (1978) to explain how alternative
timing protocols aect a benevolent government's capacity to manipulate and its incen-
tives to conrm prior expectations about its actions.3 The time inconsistency `problem'
is the observation that equilibrium outcomes in a representative-agent economy depend
2See for example Golosov et al. (2003), Kocherlakota (2005), and Golosov et al. (2007).
3While technical treatments of the time inconsistency problem rely heavily on the rational expectations
equilibrium concept, all that is needed to spot the problem is that private agents care about future gov-
ernment actions. In a discussion on August 16, 1787 at the U.S. Constitutional Convention about whether
the Federal government should be prohibited from issuing duciary currency, Gouverneur Morris, Oliver
Ellsworth, and James Madison recognized a time inconsistency problem, while Edmund Randolph and
George Mason raised doubts about tying the hands of the government by arguing that no one can foresee
all contingencies. See Madison (1987, pp. 470-471).
4on the timing protocol for decision making that nature or the modeler imposes. Better
outcomes emerge if a government chooses a history-contingent plan once-and-for-all at
time 0 than if it were allowed to choose sequentially. By choosing future actions at time
0, the government can take into account how expectations about its actions at times
t > 0 inuence private agents' actions at all dates between 0 and t. A government
must ignore those benecial expectations eects if it is forced to choose sequentially.
4. Reputation can substitute for commitment. Under rational expectations, a govern-
ment strategy plays two roles, rst, as a decision rule, and, second, as a system of
private sector expectations about government actions.4;5 A system of expectations is a
history-dependent strategy like (1). A credible government policy gives a government
incentives to conrm prior expectations about its future actions, actions it cannot
commit to because it chooses sequentially.6 There are multiple equilibrium systems
of expectations that a government would want to conrm, with incentive constraints
linking good and bad ones.
These theoretical rational expectations results have determined the way monetary policy
is now discussed within central banks. Because central banks want to implement solutions
of Ramsey problems like (2) in contexts like (1) in which the distinction between foreseen
4The theory is silent about who chooses an equilibrium system of beliefs, the government (after all, it is
the government's decision rule) or the public (but then again, they are the private sector's expectations).
This ambiguity and the multiplicity of equilibria make it dicult to use this theory to formulate advice about
actions that can help a government earn a good reputation. Instead, the theory is about how a government
comes into a period confronting the private sector's expectations about its actions, which it chooses to
conrm. Blinder (1998, pp. 60-62) struggles with this issue when he describes pressures on the Fed not to
disappoint the market. While Blinder's discussion is phrased almost entirely within the rational expectations
paradigm, the account by Bernanke (2007) of the problems the Fed experiences in anchoring private sector
expectations is not. Bernanke argues in terms of objects outside a rational expectations equilibrium.
5The theory of credible public policy seems to explain why some policy makers who surely knew about bet-
ter decision rules chose to administer ones supporting bad outcomes. Chari et al. (1998) and Albanesi et al.
(2002) interpret the big ination of the 1970s and its stabilization in the 1980s in terms of the actions of
benevolent and knowledgeable policy makers who were trapped by the public's expectations about what it
would do.
6See the credible public policy models of Stokey (1989, 1991) and Chari and Kehoe (1993b,a). By making
an intrinsically `forward-looking' variable, a promised discounted value for the representative household, also
be a `backward-looking' state variable that encodes history, Abreu et al. (1986, 1990) tie past and future
together in a subtle way that exploits the common beliefs equilibrium concept. For some applications, see
Chang (1998), Phelan and Stacchetti (2001), and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, ch. 22).
5and unforeseen policy actions is important, a time inconsistency problem like (3) arises,
prompting them to focus on ways like (4) to sustain good expectations.7
3 Justications for equating objective and subjective
distributions
These and many other theoretical results hinge on the part of the rational expectations
equilibrium concept that equates subjective distributions for endogenous variables to an
equilibrium distribution. To gain empirical content, rational expectations models also take
the logically distinct step of equating an equilibrium distribution to the data generating
distribution. I shall use asset pricing theory to illustrate two justications for that step,
one based on a survival argument that says that agents with beliefs closest to the truth will
eventually determine market prices, another on empirical convenience.
Many researchers have used consumer i's Euler equation
1 = 
Z
u0
i(ci;t+1(xt+1))
u0
i(ci;t(xt))
Rj;t+1(xt+1)fi(xt+1jx
t)dxt+1 (3)
to generate restrictions on the covariation of consumption and a one-period return Rj;t+1(xt+1)
on asset j. Here fi(xt+1jxt)  f(xt+1jxt;i) is consumer i's subjective one-step-ahead transi-
tion density for a state vector xt+1 that determines both returns and time t+1 consumption,
ci;t+1,  is a discount factor common across i, and u0
i(ci;t+1(xt+1)) is consumer i's marginal
utility of consumption. Here i is a parameter vector indexing consumer i's subjective den-
sity.
7See Blinder (1998) and Bernanke et al. (2001).
63.1 Complete markets and survival
In a nite-horizon setting, Harrison and Kreps (1979) showed that when there are complete
markets, the stochastic discount factor
mt+1 = 
u0
i(ci;t+1(xt+1))
u0
i(ci;t(xt))
fi(xt+1jxt)
f(xt+1jxt)
(4)
is unique. Here f(xt+1jxt)  f(xt+1jxt;) is a common physical conditional density param-
eterized by the vector .8 Because osetting dierences in marginal utility functions and
probabilities can leave the left side of (4) unaltered, the uniqueness of the stochastic discount
factor allows for dierent densities fi. Suppose that density f actually governs outcomes.
Blume and Easley (2006) showed that in complete markets economies with Pareto optimal
allocations and an innite horizon, the fi(x1)'s of agents who have positive wealth in the
limit merge to the density that is closest to the truth f(x1).9 Merging means that the
densities agree about tail events.10 If fi(x1) = f(x1) for some i, then for an innite horizon
complete markets economy with a Pareto optimal allocation, this survival result implies the
rational expectations assumption, provided that agents have access to an innite history of
observations at time 0.
3.2 Incomplete markets
Grossman and Shiller (1981), Hansen and Singleton (1983), and Hansen and Richard (1987)
wanted an econometric framework to apply to incomplete markets where Blume and Easley's
complete markets survival argument doesn't hold true.11 Hansen and Singleton (1983) and
8I allow fi(xtji) and f(xtj) to have dierent parameterizations partly to set the stage for subsection
4.1 and section 5.
9Closest as measured by Kullback and Leibler's relative entropy.
10In the context of a complete markets economy with a Lucas tree, Sandroni (2000) argued that a dis-
agreement about tail events would present some consumers with arbitrage opportunities that cannot exist
in equilibrium.
11It is empirically dicult to distinguish a diversity of beliefs that is inspired by dierences among mod-
els fi(xt) from one that is generated by dierent information under a common probability model. Under
a common probability model but diering information sets, Grossman and Shiller (1982) obtain an aggre-
gation of beliefs under incomplete markets in a continuous time setting with a single consumption good.
7Hansen and Richard (1987) simply imposed rational expectations and made enough sta-
tionarity assumptions to validate a Law of Large Numbers that gives GMM or maximum
likelihood estimators good asymptotic properties. Under the rational expectations assump-
tion, (3) imposes testable restrictions on the empirical joint distribution of returns and either
individual or aggregate consumption.
3.3 An empirical reason to allow for belief heterogeneity
Many have followed Hansen and Singleton (1983) and Hansen and Richard (1987) by im-
posing rational expectations, letting u(c) = c1 
1  , and dening the stochastic discount factor
as the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution
mt+1 =
u0(ct+1)
u0(ct)
: (5)
The aggregate consumption data have mistreated (5) and the Euler equation
1 =
Z
mt+1(x
t+1)Rj;t+1(xt+1)f(xt+1jx
t)dxt+1: (6)
One reaction has been to retain the rational expectations assumption but to add backward-
looking (see Campbell and Cochrane (1999)) or forward-looking (see Epstein and Zin (1989))
contributions to time t felicity. Another reaction has been to let disparate beliefs contribute
to the stochastic discount factor. Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) treated the stochastic dis-
count factor mt+1 as an unknown nonnegative random variable and deduced what observed
returns Rj;t+1 and restriction (6) imply about the rst and second moments of admissible
stochastic discount factors (with incomplete markets, there exist multiple stochastic dis-
count factors). Their idea was that prior to specifying a particular theory about the utility
When the value of a continuously and costlessly traded asset i and all individuals' consumption ows are
diusions, Grossman and Shiller show that the excess return on asset i is explained by its covariance with
aggregate consumption, conditioned on any information set that is common to all investors. To get this
result, Grossman and Shiller apply a law of iterated expectations with respect to a probability model that
is common to all investors.
8function linking m to real variables like consumption, it is useful to characterize the mean
and standard deviation that an empirically successful m must have. This approach leaves
open the possibility that a successful theory of a stochastic discount factor will assign a
role to a uctuating probability ratio
fi(xt+1jxt)
f(xt+1jxt) 6= 1 even for an economy in which agent i
is a single representative agent. The likelihood ratio
fi(xt+1jxt)
f(xt+1jxt) creates a wedge relative to
the Euler equation that has usually been t in the rational expectations macroeconomic
tradition originating in Hansen and Singleton (1983) and Mehra and Prescott (1985). Like-
lihood ratio wedge approaches have been investigated by Bossaerts (2002, 2004), Hansen
(2007), Hansen and Sargent (2007), and Cogley and Sargent (2007), among others. The art
in Hansen (2007) is to extend rational expectations enough to understand the data bet-
ter while retaining the econometric discipline that rational expectations models acquire by
economizing on free parameters that characterize agents' beliefs.12
3.4 Another empirical reason to allow for belief heterogeneity
Applied macroeconomists study data that can be weakly informative about parameters
and model features. Ultimately, this is why dierences of opinion about how an econ-
omy works can persist. The philosophy of Anderson et al. (2003), Hansen (2007), and
Hansen and Sargent (2007) is to let agents inside a model have views that can diverge from
the truth in ways about which the data speak quietly and slowly.
4 Rational expectations econometrics
Ideas from rational expectations econometrics motivate stories and models that feature gaps
between an objective distribution and the temporary subjective distributions used by a gov-
ernment that solves a sequence of intelligent design problems. I review econometric methods
that allow an outsider to learn about a rational expectations equilibrium and introduce some
12Hansen (2007) brings only one new free parameter that governs how much a representative agent's beliefs
are exponentially twisted vis-a-vis the data generating mechanism.
9objects and possibilities that are in play in models containing agents who are learning an
equilibrium.
A rational expectations equilibrium is a joint probability density f(xtjo) over histories xt
indexed by free parameters o 2  that describe preferences, technologies, endowments, and
information. For reasons that will become clear, I have called the parameter vector  rather
than  as in section 2. Rational expectations econometrics tells an econometrician who is
outside the model how to learn . The econometrician knows only a parametric form for the
model and therefore initially knows less about the equilibrium joint probability distribution
than nature and the agents inside the model. The econometrician's tools for learning  are (i)
a likelihood function, (ii) a time series or panel of observations drawn from the equilibrium
distribution, and (iii) a Law of Large Numbers, a Central Limit Theorem, and some large
deviations theorems that characterize limits, rates of convergence, and tail behaviors of
estimators. With enough data and a correct likelihood function, an econometrician can
learn o.
A rational expectations equilibrium evaluated at a particular history is a likelihood func-
tion:
L(x
tj) = f(x
tj) = f(xtjx
t 1;)f(xt 1jx
t 2;)f(x1jx0;)f(x0j): (7)
The most condent and ambitious branch of rational expectations econometrics recommends
maximizing a likelihood function or combining it with a Bayesian prior p() to construct a
posterior p(jxt).13 In choosing  to maximize a likelihood function, a rational expectations
econometrician in eect searches simultaneously for a stochastic process of exogenous vari-
ables and a system of expectations that prompts forward-looking articial agents inside a
model to make decisions that best t the data.14 Taking logs in (7) gives
logL(jx
t) = `(xtjx
t 1;) + `(xt 1jx
t 2;) +  + `(x1jx0;) + `(x0j) (8)
13For early applications of this empirical approach, see Sargent (1977), Sargent (1979), Hansen and Sargent
(1980), Taylor (1980), and Dagli and Taylor (1984).
14As the econometrician searches over probability measures indexed by , he imputes to the agents inside
the system of expectations implied by the  under consideration.
10where `(xtjxt 1;) = logf(xtjxt 1;): Dene the score function as st(xt;) =
@`(xtjxt 1;)
@ .
The rst-order conditions for maximum likelihood estimation are
1
t + 1
t X
=0
s(x
; ^ t) = 0: (9)
By solving these equations, an econometrician nds a ^ t that allows him to approximate the
equilibrium density very well as t ! +1.
4.1 Using a misspecied model to estimate a better one
Lucas (1976) convinced us that non-structural models are bad vehicles for policy analysis.
But the rst-order conditions for estimating a good tting non-structural model can help to
make good inferences about parameters of a structural economic model.
Indirect estimation assumes that a researcher wants to estimate a parameter vector  of
a structural rational expectations model for which (1) analytical diculties prevent evaluat-
ing a likelihood function f(xtj) directly, and (2) computational methods allow simulating
time series from f(xtj) at a given vector . See Gourieroux et al. (1993), Smith (1993),
and Gallant and Tauchen (1996). Indirect estimation carries along two models, a model of
economic interest with an intractable likelihood function, and an auxiliary purely statistical
model with a tractable likelihood function that ts the historical data well. The parameters
of the economist's model  are interpretable in terms of preferences, technologies, and infor-
mation sets, while the parameters  of the auxiliary model f(xtj) are data tting devices.
The idea of Gallant and Tauchen (1996) is, rst, to estimate the auxiliary model by maxi-
mum likelihood, then to use the score functions for the auxiliary model and the rst-order
conditions (9) to construct a GMM estimator that can be used in conjunction with simula-
tions of the economic model to estimate the parameters . Thus, let the auxiliary model have
a log likelihood function given by equation (8) and, for the data sample in hand, compute
the maximum likelihood estimate ^ . For dierent 's, simulate paths x() for  = 0;:::;t
11from the economic model. Think of using these articial data to evaluate the score function
for the auxiliary model s(x(); ^ ) for each . Gallant and Tauchen estimate  by setting
the average score for the auxiliary model15
1
t + 1
t X
=0
s(x
(); ^ ) (10)
as close to zero as possible when measured by a quadratic form of the type used in GMM.
If the auxiliary model ts well, this method gives good estimates of the parameters  of the
economic model. In particular, the indirect estimator is as ecient as maximum likelihood
in the ideal case where the economic and auxiliary models are observationally equivalent.
4.2 A troublesome possibility
This ideal case raises the following question: what happens when macroeconomic policy
makers incorrectly use what from nature's point of view is actually an auxiliary model?
Data give the government no indication that it should abandon its model. Nevertheless,
the government can make major policy design mistakes because its misunderstands the
consequences of policies that it has not chosen.16 The possibility that the government uses
what, unbeknownst to it, is an auxiliary model, not a structural one, sets the stage for the
self-conrming equilibria that play an important role in the adaptive learning models of the
following section and in the stories to be told in sections 6 and 7.
5 Adaptive learning models and their limiting out-
comes
Section 3 described how a survival argument for equating objective and subjective distri-
butions falls short in many economies. This section takes up where that discussion left o
15This description ts what they call Case 2.
16See Lucas (1976), Sargent (1999, ch. 7), and Fudenberg and Levine (2007).
12by describing transient and limiting outcomes in models in which agents make decisions by
using statistical models that at least temporarily are misspecied. I summarize ndings
from a literature that studies systems of agents who use forward-looking decision algorithms
based on temporary models that they update using recursive least squares algorithms (see
Marcet and Sargent (1989a), Evans and Honkapohja (1999, 2001), Woodford (1990), and
Fudenberg and Levine (1998)).17 These adaptive systems can have limiting outcomes in
which objective and subjective distributions are identical over frequently observed events,
but not over rarely observed events. That causes problems for intelligent macroeconomic
policy design. I shall use such adaptive systems to tell some stories in section 7. I begin by
dening population objects that suppose that agents have nished learning.
5.1 Self-conrming equilibrium
.
A true data generating process and an approximating model, respectively, are
f(y
1;v
1j) and f(y
1;v
1j): (11)
A decision maker has preferences ordered by
Z
U(y
1;v
1)f(y
1;v
1j)d(y
1;v
1) (12)
and chooses a history-dependent plan
vt = ht(x
tj); t  0 (13)
that maximizes (12). This gives rise to the sequence of decisions v(hj)1. The dierence
between this choice problem and the canonical intelligent design problem in section 2 is the
17Appendix A describes a related literature on learning in games.
13presence of the approximating model f(y1;v1j) in (12) rather than the true model that
appeared in (2). I call maximizing (12) a \Phelps problem" in honor of a policy design
problem of Phelps (1967) that will play an important role in section 7.
Denition 5.1. A self-conrming equilibrium (SCE) is a parameter vector o for the ap-
proximating model that satises the data-matching conditions
f(y
1;v(hjo)
1jo) = f(y
1;v(hjo)
1j): (14)
An SCE builds in, rst, optimization of (12) given beliefs indexed by o, and, second, a
 = o that satises the data matching conditions (14). Data matching prevails for events
that occur under the equilibrium policy v(hjo)1, but it is possible that
f(y
1;v
1jo) 6= f(y
1;v
1j) (15)
for v1 6= v(hjo)1. In an SCE, the approximating model is observationally equivalent with
the true model for events that occur under the SCE government policy, but not necessarily
under alternative government policies.
5.2 Learning converges to an SCE
An SCE is a possible limit point of an adaptive learning process. Bray and Kreps (1987)
distinguish between learning about an equilibrium and learning within an equilibrium.18 By
saying about and not within, Bray and Kreps emphasize that the challenge is to analyze how
a system of agents can come to learn an endogenous objective distribution by using adaptive
algorithms that do not simply apply Bayes' law to a correct probability model.19 We cannot
18A dicult challenge in the machine learning literature is to construct an adaptive algorithm that learns
dynamic programming. For a recent signicant advance based on the application of the adjoint of a resolvent
operator and a law of large numbers, see Meyn (2007, ch. 11).
19Bray and Kreps's `about' versus `within' tension also pertains to Bayesian theories of convergence to Nash
equilibria. Marimon (1997) said that a Bayesian knows the truth from the beginning. Young (2004) pointed
out that the absolute continuity assumption underlying the beautiful convergence result of Kalai and Lehrer
14appeal to the same econometrics that lets a rational expectations econometrician learn an
equilibrium because an econometrician is outside the model and his learning is a side-show
that does not aect the data generating mechanism. It is dierent when people learning
about an equilibrium are inside the model. Their learning aects decisions and alters the
distribution of endogenous variables over time, making them aim at moving targets.
Suppose that an adaptive learner begins with an initial estimate ^ 0 at time 0 and uses a
recursive least squares learning algorithm
^ t+1   ^ t = e(^ t;y
t;v
t;t): (16)
As in the models of learning in games of Foster and Young (2003) and Young (2004, ch. 8),
we assume that decision makers mistakenly regard their time t model indexed by ^ t as
permanent and form the sequence of decisions20
^ v(h)t = ht(x
tj^ t) (17)
where ht(xtj) is the same function (13) that solves the original Phelps problem (12) under
the model f(y1;v1j). The joint density of (y1;v1; ^ 1) becomes
f(y
1; ^ v(h)
1; ^ 
1j): (18)
(1993, 1994) requires that players have substantial prior knowledge about their opponents' strategies. Young
doubts that Kalai and Lehrer have answered the question \::: can one identify priors [over opponents strate-
gies] whose support is wide enough to capture the strategies that one's (rational) opponents are actually
using, without assuming away the uncertainty inherent in the situation?" Young (2004, p. 95)
20Cho and Kasa (2006) create a model structure closer to the vision of Foster and Young (2003). In
particular, Cho and Kasa's model has the following structure: (1) one or more decision makers take actions
at time t by solving a dynamic programming problem based on a possibly misspecied time t model, (2) the
actions of some of those decision makers inuence the data-generating process; (3) a decision maker shows
that he is aware of possible misspecications of his model by trying to detect them with an econometric
specication test, (4) if the specication test rejects the model, the decision maker selects an improved model,
while (5) if the current model is not rejected, the decision maker formulates policy using the model under the
assumption (used to formulate the dynamic programming problem) that he will retain this model forever.
Cho and Kasa show that the same stochastic approximation and large deviations results that pertain to a
least-squares learning setup also describe the outcomes of their model-validation setup.
15The learning literature states restrictions on the estimator e and the densities f(j) and
f(j) that imply that
^ t ! o; (19)
where convergence can be either almost surely or in distribution, depending on details of the
estimator e in (16).21
5.3 Applications of adaptive learning models in macroeconomics
One important application of adaptive models in macroeconomics has been to select among
multiple rational expectations equilibria (see Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for many use-
ful examples). Another has been to choose among alternative representations of policy
rules from Ramsey problems, a subset of which are stable under adaptive learning (see
Evans and Honkapohja (2003)). Another has been to improve the ts of models of asset
pricing and big inations by positing small gaps between an objective density and asset
holders' subjective densities (e.g., Adam et al. (2006) and Marcet and Nicolini (2003)). In
the remainder of this paper, I focus on yet another application, namely, to situations in
which a government solves an intelligent design problem using a misspecied model.
5.4 REE or SCE?
Some builders of adaptive models have specied an approximating model to equal a true
one, meaning that there exists a value o for which f(y1;v1j) = f(y1;v1jo) for all plans
v1, not just equilibrium ones. This specication prevails in adaptive models in which least
squares learning schemes converge to rational expectations equilibria (see Woodford (1990)
and Marcet and Sargent (1989b)). When f(y1;v1j) 6= f(y1;v1jo) for some choices of v,
21For example, so-called `constant gain' algorithms give rise to convergence in distribution, while estimators
whose gains diminish at proper rates converge almost surely. See Williams (2004). Marcet and Sargent
(1995) study rates of convergence and provide some examples in which convergence occurs at a
p
T rate and
others in which convergence occurs markedly more slowly.
16the most that can be hoped for is convergence to an SCE.22
5.5 SCE-REE gaps and policy design
Why is a gap between a rational expectations equilibrium and a self-conrming equilibrium
important for a macroeconomist? Macroeconomists build models with many small agents
and some large agents called governments. It doesn't matter to a small agent that his
views may be incorrect views o an equilibrium path. But it can matter very much when a
large agent like a government has incorrect views o an equilibrium path because in solving
a Ramsey problem, a government contemplates the consequences of o-equilibrium path
experiments. Wrong views about o-equilibrium path events shape government policy and
the equilibrium path.
To illustrate these ideas, I sample some historical events that central bankers have learned
from. Section 6 summarizes hundreds of years of monetary theories and experiments that
took us to the threshold of the 20th century experiment with at currency. Section 7 jumps
ahead to the 1960s and 1970s and uses statistical models to describe how the U.S. monetary
authorities struggled to understand ination-unemployment dynamics as they sought to meet
their dual mandate of promoting high output growth and low ination.
6 Learning monetary policy before and after Ricardo
Central bankers are preoccupied with nominal anchors. For centuries, commodity monies
built in redundant nominal anchors. When Ricardo wrote, new technologies of coin produc-
22Sargent (1999, ch. 6) works with a weaker notion of an SCE that Branch and Evans (2005, 2006) call a
misspecication equilibrium. Branch and Evans construct misspecication equilibria in which agents i and
j have dierent models parameterized, say, by i and j, and in which f(xtji) 6= f(xtjj) 6= f(xtj), where
again  parameterizes the data generating mechanism. A misspecication equilibrium imposes moment condi-
tions on agents' approximating models that imply parameters i that give equal minimum mean square error
forecast errors Ej[(xt+1   Ej(xt+1jxt))(xt+1   Ej(xt+1jxt))0] for all surviving models. Branch and Evans
model equilibria in which beliefs and forecasts are heterogeneous across agents, though they have equal
mean squared errors. They provide conditions under which recursive least squares learning algorithms con-
verge to a subset of the possible misspecication equilibria. The models of Brock and Hommes (1997) and
Brock and de Fontnouvelle (2000) are early versions of misspecication equilibria.
17tion and expert opinion had established the condence to dispense with redundant nominal
anchors and to rely on a unique anchor taking the form of melt-mint points for a single
standard commodity coin. In the twentieth century, monetary authorities implemented Ri-
cardo's recommendation to banish precious metals from the monetary system and sought an
alternative monetary anchor based on a theory of at money and the public's faith in the
wisdom and good intentions of the monetary authorities.
6.1 From commodity to token to at money
Appendix B describes a 700 year process of theorizing and experimenting that transformed
a European commodity money system with many nominal anchors { mint-melt price pairs
(i.e., gold or silver points) for full bodied coins of all denominations { to a one nominal anchor
system that retained gold points for only one standard full bodied coin and used government-
issued convertible token coins and notes for other denominations.23 After another 100 years,
governments abolished the gold points for the standard coin too, leaving the nominal anchor
to be the monetary authorities' knowledge of the quantity theory of money and their good
intentions. Appendix B notes how commodity money concealed the quantity theory of money
by making the price level be a low variance exogenous variable and the money supply be a low
variance endogenous variable. I see a self-conrming equilibrium working here. Eventually,
some atypical policy experiments generated data with sucient variance in price levels and
money supplies to reveal the quantity theory to empiricists, a theory that led to Ricardo's
proposal and ultimately induced monetary experts like Keynes to advocate a well-managed
at system.
23Fetter (1978, p. 16) and Friedman (1991, pp. 150-151) discuss how concerns about small denomination
coins shaped the gold standard.
186.2 Two threats to a well managed at money system
Friedman (1991, pp. 249-252) claimed that our at money system is historically unprece-
dented and repeated the warning of Fisher (1926, p.131) that \Irredeemable paper money
has almost invariably proved a curse to the country employing it" because two obstacles ob-
struct the path to managing a at currency well: (i) political pressures to use at money to
nance government expenditures, and (ii) temptations to exploit a Phillips curve (Friedman
(1991, p. 207)). Learning models have been used to interpret monetary authorities' strug-
gles to understand and avoid these obstacles. Marcet and Nicolini (2003) and Sargent et al.
(2006a) constructed adaptive models that focus on Friedman's obstacle (i) and feature pri-
vate agents' learning. Those papers both select among rational equilibria and modify their
outcomes enough to t data from big inations in Latin America. In the remainder of
this paper, I focus on statistical models that feature monetary authorities' struggles with
Friedman's obstacle (ii).
7 Learning ination-unemployment dynamics
This section describes three stories about how the U.S. monetary authorities learned about
ination-unemployment dynamics after World War II. These stories assume that a monetary
authority can control ination if it wants.24 Then why did the U.S. monetary authority
allow ination to rise in the late 1960s and 1970s, and why did it bring ination down in
the 1980s and 1990s? If we assume that its purposes did not change, and that it always
disliked ination and unemployment, then it is natural to focus on changes over time in
the monetary authority's understanding of ination-unemployment dynamics. I describe
three stories associated with empirical models that feature either temporary or permanent
discrepancies between a government's model and a true data generating mechanism.25
24Appendix C discusses a monetary policy rules literature that focuses on the gap between the monetary
authorities' instruments and ination outcomes.
25For testimony that policy authorities in the U.S. are concerned about related issues, see Bernanke
(2007) and Mishkin (2007). See Evans and Honkapohja (2003), Orphanides and Williams (2005, 2007), and
19It is natural to impute popular contemporary models to the government. The `revisionist
history' of the U.S. Phillips curve by King and Watson (1994) provides a good source for
these. King and Watson studied how econometric directions of t (i.e., should one regress
ination on unemployment or unemployment on ination?) aect government decisions. To
make contact with studies from the 1970s, King and Watson call regressions of ination on
unemployment the Keynesian direction of t and unemployment on ination the classical
direction.26 I impute simplied versions of more completely articulated models to the gov-
ernment.27 These simple models capture the substantially dierent operating characteristics
that drive our stories.
The three stories have monetary authorities solve adaptive intelligent design problems
that induce them to make decisions that are inuenced by their erroneous views about
the consequences of actions not taken. The stories dier in the nature of those misunder-
standings. In the rst story, the monetary authority's misspecied model misses a chain of
causation linking its decisions rst to the private sector's expectations of ination and then
to the position of an unemployment-ination trade-o. In the second story, there exists a
parameter vector o =  that aligns the monetary authority's model with the data generating
mechanism on and o the chosen stochastic monetary policy path, but except in the limit
as t ! 1, the government's temporary misestimates ^ t of o induce it to misunderstand the
consequences of policies that it chooses not to implement. In the third story, the government
mixes across submodels with operating characteristics that give very dierent readings about
the consequences of following a no-feedback low ination policy.
Bullard and Mitra (2007) for applications of models of this type to evaluating the stability and performance
of alternative monetary policy rules. See Cogley (2005) and Piazzesi and Schneider (2007) for applications
to the yield curve.
26Sargent (1999, ch. 7) described how those specication decisions can aect self-conrming equilibrium
outcomes.
27Some economists today use the slang `reduced form' to refer to incompletely articulated models. I prefer
to reserve the term `reduced form' for its original meaning in Cowles commission econometrics, namely, a
particular statistical representation associated with a well articulated structural model.
207.1 The (temporary) conquest of U.S. ination
This story is about generating sucient variation in the data to allow a government's mis-
specied model to detect that there is no exploitable trade-o between ination and un-
employment. The only way the government's model lets it discover that there truly is no
exploitable tradeo is for it falsely to infer that there is no tradeo whatsoever. That imper-
fection dooms stabilizations of ination to be temporary.
This story uses specications f(y1;v1j) 6= f(y1;v1j) to capture the idea that a mon-
etary authority misunderstands how its decisions aect private agents' expectations about
ination and, therefore, the joint distribution of unemployment and ination. I illustrate the
forces at work with the following simplied version of a model that Sims (1988), Cho et al.
(2002), and Sargent and Williams (2005) studied and that Chung (1990), Sargent (1999),
and Sargent et al. (2006b) t to U.S. data. The true model is
U = 0   13w2 + 2w1 (20)
 = v + 3w2; (21)
where U is the unemployment rate,  is the rate of ination, v is the systematic part of
the ination rate chosen by the monetary authority, w is a 2  1 Gaussian random vector
with mean zero and identity covariance, and 0 > 0;1 > 0, where 0 is the natural rate
of unemployment and 1 is the slope of the Phillips curve. The parameters 2 and 3 set
the volatility of the shocks. Through equation (20), which is the aggregate supply curve
proposed by Lucas (1973), the model captures a rational expectations version of the natural
unemployment rate hypothesis that asserts that the systematic component of ination v does
not aect the distribution of the unemployment rate conditional on v. The government's
one-period loss function is E(U2 + 2).
The government's approximating model denies the natural rate hypothesis by asserting
21that v aects the probability distribution of U according to
U = 0 + 1(v + 3 ~ w2) + 2 ~ w1 (22)
 = v + 3 ~ w2; (23)
where the random vector ~ w has the same distribution as w. Under the true model and
the protocol that the government chooses target ination before the private sector sets
its expectation of ination, the government's best policy is v = 0. However, under the
approximating model (22)-(23), the government's best policy is
v = h() =
 10
1 + 2
1
: (24)
There exists a unique self-conrming equilibrium in which
(0)o = 0 + 1h(o) (25)
(1)o =  1 (26)
and (2)o = 2;(3)o = 3. The self-conrming equilibrium equals the time-consistent equi-
librium of Kydland and Prescott (1977).28 An adaptive government's estimates ^ t converge
to the self-conrming equilibrium vector o, and the systematic part of ination converges
to v = h(o).
The data-matching restriction (25) pinpoints how the government mistakenly ignores the
eect of its policy choice v, which also equals the public's expected rate of ination, on the
position of the Phillips curve. The population regression coecient of U on  is 1 =
 12
3
var(v)+2
3.
If historically v had been randomly generated with enough variance, then even though it ts
the wrong model, the government would estimate a Phillips curve slope 1 of approximately
28The same suboptimal outcome occurs, but for a dierent reason than the inferior timing protocol isolated
by Kydland and Prescott (1977). Here the source of sub optimality is the government's ignorance. The
timing protocol is such that if the government knew the correct model, it would attain what Stokey (1989)
calls a Ramsey outcome of v = 0.
22zero and according to (24) would set v approximately to its optimal value of 0 under the
true model.29 But within an SCE, v doesn't vary enough for the government to estimate a
1 close enough to zero for that to happen. Furthermore, the outcome that ^ t ! o means
that the variation of vt that occurs along transient paths converging to an SCE is insucient
to allow the government's model to approximate the data in a way that tells it to implement
the optimal policy under the true model.
However, that is not the end of the story because the adaptive model's endogenous
stochastic dynamics occasionally make v vary enough for the government to discover a ver-
sion of the natural rate hypothesis that is too strong because it mistakenly asserts that there
is almost no tradeo whatsoever between  and U. The adaptive system is destined to
experience recurrent episodes in which `a most likely unlikely' sequence of w's lowers the un-
conditional correlation between U and , which alters ^ t in ways that induce the government
to push vt below its self-conrming value.30 That generates data that further weakens the
unconditional correlation between ination and unemployment and moves ^ t in a direction
that drives v even lower. The ultimate destination of this `escape' from a self-conrming
equilibrium is that the government estimates that 1 is close to 0, prompting it to set vt
close to the optimal value 0. These escapes are more likely when the government's estimator
(16) discounts past data more heavily, for example, by implementing a so-called constant
gain algorithm. An escape is temporary because the mean dynamics that drive the system
toward the SCE vector o are bound to reassert themselves and push ination back toward
the suboptimal SCE value of h(o). If this is a good parable for the Volcker-Greenspan
stabilization, we should be worried.
29Before adopting such a randomized policy for ination, a monetary authority should consider the forces
isolated by Jones and Manuelli (2001).
30That unlikely events occur in the most likely way is a key aspect of large deviation theory. See Cho et al.
(2002) for an elaboration of `most likely unlikely' sequences of shocks.
237.1.1 Details
Simulations of Sims (1988) generated sample paths that seemed promising for explaining
a Volcker-like stabilization prompted by the government's ability to learn a good enough
version of the natural rate hypothesis. However, formal econometric attempts to implement
the model by Chung (1990) and Sargent (1999) failed to t the U.S. data well, mainly because
the government's adaptive algorithm caught on to the adverse shifts in the Phillips curve
quickly in the early 1970s. Sargent et al. (2006b) replaced the constant gain algorithm used
in the earlier models with a Bayesian updating procedure implied by a drifting coecients
model with covariance matrix V for the innovations in the drifts to the coecients. By
estimating V along with the parameters of nature's model by maximum likelihood, they
reverse engineered a drifting set of government beliefs that, when put into the Phelps problem
each period, produce a sequence of rst period Phelps policy recommendations that do a
good job of matching the actual ination data. The estimated V implies that the intercept
in the Fed's model is quite volatile and thus makes contact with Arthur Burns's Fed, which
according to Hetzel (1998), attributed much of the ination of the 1970s to special factors
akin to dummy variables that capture intercept drift in regressions. More generally, the large
estimated V conveys the image of a government that expects coecients to drift so much
that it discounts past data heavily. The statistical model's conjuring up a Fed that over ts
its models to recent data is food for thought for Fed watchers. The synthesized government
beliefs succeed in rationalizing ination ex post as a response to these government beliefs,
and the beliefs themselves do a good job of forecasting ination, thus capturing what seems
to have been a remarkably good record of ination forecasting by the Fed (see Bernanke
(2007)).31
31But relative to available alternatives, the imputed beliefs do a poor job of forecasting unemployment, a
deciency of the model that hints that the reverse-engineering exercise may be imputing unrealistic views
about joint ination-unemployment dynamics to the Phelps problem in order to rationalize observed ina-
tion outcomes. By conditioning estimates on greenbook forecasts, Carboni and Ellison (2007) repair this
deciency and also reduce the estimated V while leaving the basic story intact.
247.1.2 The best of all possible worlds?
In the preceding story, policy choices recurrently revisit ones that are optimal under the
correct model, but they don't stay there because the mean dynamics attracting them to the
suboptimal SCE are destined to revive. Thus, this story at best only temporarily supports
the optimism expressed by Sims (1988) that the government's misspecied model can ap-
proximate the lack of an exploitable U    tradeo well enough to induce the government
to do what would be the right thing if it actually knew the true model. For the misspecied
model to reveal the lack of an exploitable tradeo, the government has to induce adequate
variation in ination, which it does not do within an SCE. So the rst story stops short of
being one in which evolution converges to `the best of all possible worlds.' A more optimistic
outcome prevails in our next story, which endows the government with a model that allows
its misunderstandings of o-equilibrium-path choices eventually to vanish.
7.2 A Keynesian account
The previous story is about how the troublesome possibility raised in subsection 4.2 plays
out. The model of Primiceri (2006) envisions a world in which that possibility is o the
table because f(y1;v1j) = f(y1;v1jo) for all v1 and an SCE equals an REE. All of the
action in Primiceri's model comes from calibrating an initial ^ 0 6= o that leads to a transient
stochastic path that converges to an SCE presided over by Greenspan and whose transient
dynamics mimic the post WWII U.S.
Primiceri's denition of an SCE is special in that, while it sets the government's model
f(xtj) equal to the true model f(xtj), it assumes that private agents make forecasts of
ination that do not equal those implied by f(xtj). There is implicitly a third density
f(xt) inside the model that equals neither the government's f(xtj) nor nature's f(xtj). In
particular, Primiceri assumes that f(xtj) = f(xtj) is a version of a Solow-Tobin model
that itself imputes irrational expectations about ination to the private sector.32
32See Solow (1968), Tobin (1968), Lucas (1972a), and Sargent (1971).
25Primiceri has a time invariant true data generating model featuring (i) an expectations
augmented Phillips curve; (ii) a Cagan (1956)-Friedman (1956) adaptive expectations scheme
that describes how the public forms expectations of ination that appear in (i)33; (iii) an
aggregate demand equation that describes how the time t value of an uninterpreted govern-
ment policy instrument vt aects current and future gaps between the unemployment rate
ut and a natural rate of unemployment uN
t ;34 and (iv) a one-period government loss function
(t   )2 + (ut   k^ uN
t )2 where  is a target rate of ination and ^ uN
t is the government's
estimate of natural unemployment rate. The model allows the government's mispercep-
tion of the natural rate to inuence policy, as advocated by Orphanides (2002, 2003). It
also allows two other aspects of government perceptions to inuence policy in important
ways, namely, perceptions about the persistence of ination and about the contemporaneous
trade-o between ination and unemployment.
Primiceri's maximum likelihood estimates succeed in accounting for the acceleration of
ination in the 1960s and 1970s, then the fall in the 1980s in terms of the government's
initial underestimates of the natural unemployment rate and a temporal pattern of under-
estimates of the persistence of ination and overestimates of the costs of disination coming
from its estimated ination-unemployment tradeo.35 Figure 1 reproduces Primiceri's gure
II, which shows his estimates of the evolution of the Fed's estimates of the natural rate of
33Primiceri assumes that a fraction of agents forms expectations this way and the rest have rational
expectations. Primiceri's specication imposes that the sum of weights on lagged ination equals unity.
Lucas (1972a) and Sargent (1971) argued that, except in a special case, the sum of the weights on lagged
ination being one is not a valid implication of rational expectations. Also see King and Watson (1994) and
Sargent (1999). Muth (1960) deduced a density f(xt) that rationalizes Friedman's adaptive expectations
scheme.
34Feature (ii) of Primiceri's model embraces a Keynesian spirit of assuming that the authority inuences
output directly through the aggregate demand function, then ination indirectly through the expectations-
augmented Phillips curve. Contrast this with the classical specication adopted by Sims (1988), Chung
(1990), Sargent (1999), Cho et al. (2002), and Sargent et al. (2006b).
35Primiceri calibrates initial government beliefs by using data between 1948 and 1960 to estimate the
model's parameters.36 These calibrated beliefs feature a level of persistence of ination in the Phillips curve
that is much lower than what prevails in the estimated model's self-conrming equilibrium. In addition to
these initial conditions, Primiceri sets two constant gain parameters, one for the natural rate, another for
all other coecients in the government's beliefs. These calibrated objects, the data, and the parameters of
the structural relations pin down the government's beliefs. Primiceri uses maximum likelihood to estimate
parameters appearing in the government's objective function and the time-invariant structural equations.
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Figure 1: Evolution of policy-maker's beliefs about: (a) the natural rate of unemployment;
(b) the persistence of ination in the Phillips curve; and (c) the slope of the Phillips curve in
King and Watson's Keynesian direction. Shaded areas are where the government (a) underesti-
mates the natural rate of unemployment, (b) underestimates the persistence of ination, and (c)
thinks that the sacrice ratio is very large. Source: I have modied a gure of Primiceri (2006,
p. 882).
unemployment, the persistence of ination, and the slope of the Phillips curve. Primiceri's
Phelps problem attributes the acceleration of ination to the monetary authority's initial
underestimates of both the natural rate and the persistence of ination. A low estimated
persistence of ination indicates to the government that mean reverting ination will evap-
orate soon enough on its own, making a less anti-inationary policy emerge from the Phelps
problem. After ination had risen, the Phelps problem attributes the monetary authority's
reluctance to deate to its overestimate of the costs of disination as captured by the slope
of the Phillips curve. We will return to this point in subsection 7.3, where we link it to the
conceptual issues about direction of t raised by King and Watson (1994).37
Under-estimates of the natural unemployment rate and over-estimates of the sacrice
ratio are connected. When the Fed under-estimates the natural rate and over-estimates the
unemployment gap, it over-predicts the amount of disination. That causes it to revise its
37Among many interesting features of Primiceri's results are his estimate of k, the parameter in the
government's one-period loss function that allows Primiceri to evaluate the government's temptation to
deviate from the natural rate (he nds that the temptation is small) and the time series that he extracts for
vt, which tracks a real interest rate very well after 1980.
27estimate of the slope of the Phillips curve towards zero. Thus, Orphanides's story about the
consequences of missestimating the natural rate of unemployment complements Primiceri's
story about sacrice ratio pessimism.
7.3 An eclectic account
The stories in the previous two sections take stands on both the true and the government's
approximating models. Cogley and Sargent (2005) perform an exercise that does not require
specifying a true data generating mechanism, the empirical distribution being enough. But
the government's views about the consequences of choosing alternative feasible policies con-
tinue to play the leading role. The government's model f(y1;v1j) mixes three submodels
according to Bayesian posterior probabilities that are included in the vector ^ t.
A government entertains three models that Cogley and Sargent use to capture prominent
specications from the literature about U.S. unemployment-ination dynamics described
by King and Watson (1994). The models are (1) a Samuelson-Solow Phillips curve with
King and Watson's Keynesian direction of t, a model that implies a long-run exploitable
trade-o between ination and unemployment; (2) a Solow-Tobin model with a Keynesian
direction of t that features a short-run but no long-run trade-o between ination and
unemployment (albeit according to what Lucas (1972a) and Sargent (1971) claimed was an
unsound notion of long-run); and (3) a Lucas specication with a classical direction of t that
implies no exploitable trade-o between ination and unemployment. If the Lucas model has
probability one, the Phelps problem gives the trivial solution that the government should set
the systematic part of ination equal to zero. If either of the other models has probability
one, the systematic part of ination is a linear function of the state variables appearing in
those exploitable dynamic Phillips curves. The government attaches positive probability to
all three models, so the Phelps problem brokers a compromise among the recommendations
of the three models. But what kind of compromise? It depends on submodel probabilities
times value functions.
28The government starts with a prior with non-zero weights on all three models in 1960,
then each period uses Bayes' law to update parameters of each of the three submodels and
also its prior over the submodels.38 In each period, the government solves a Phelps problem
that penalizes ination and unemployment and that uses its time t submodel probabilities
to average over its time t estimates of its three submodels. Cogley and Sargent put prior
probabilities in 1960 of .98 on the Samuelson-Solow model and .01 each on the Solow-
Tobin and the Lucas model. We set those low prior probabilities on the Lucas and Solow-
Tobin models because only the Samuelson-Solow model existed in 1960.39 Applying this
machine to U.S. ination-unemployment data, Cogley and Sargent computed time series of
both the posterior model weights i;t and the systematic part of the ination rate set by the
government in the Phelps problem.
Figures 2 and 3 taken from Cogley and Sargent (2005) frame the following puzzles. By
the early 1970s, the data had moved the government's prior to put probability approaching
1 on the Lucas model that recommends zero ination (see gure 2). Why nevertheless
was actual ination so high and variable in the 1970s? And why was the systematic part of
ination that emerges from the Phelps problem (see gure 3) even higher and more variable?
Why did the Phelps planner discount the recommendations of the Lucas model despite its
high posterior probability?
The answer is to be found in what the Samuelson-Solow and Solow-Tobin models say
would happen if the Lucas zero-target-ination policy were to be adopted (see gure 4).
The Phelps problem weighs the submodel posterior probabilities against losses associated
with various o-taken-path recommendations. In the early 1970s, their Keynesian direction
38See Cogley et al. (2007) for a related setup that has only two submodels, each of which has known
coecients, and in which the government designs purposeful experiments because it includes the submodel
probabilities in the state vector. By way of contrast, the model being discussed in the text has the government
making decisions as if its temporary mixture of models would prevail forever and therefore excludes purposeful
experimentation. Cogley et al. (2008) study purposeful experimentation when a government trusts neither
its submodels nor its Bayesian posterior over submodels.
39We have to put positive probabilities on the yet-to-be invented models in 1960 in order to launch our
story. Foster and Young (2003) introduce new models randomly while having only one model being used to
guide decisions at any moment.
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Figure 2: Top panel: CPI ination. Bottom panel: Bayesian posterior model weights on the
Samuelson-Solow (SS), Solow-Tobin (ST), and Lucas (L) models.
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Figure 3: CPI ination and recommendation from Phelps problem.
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Figure 4: Loss from SS model (*) and ST model (). A value 1 denotes innite loss under
Lucas zero ination policy. A value 0 denotes nite loss.
of t moved the coecients in those submodels in ways that pointed to very high sacrice
ratios. Despite their low posterior probabilities, those models implied very high expected
discounted losses if the Lucas policy recommendation were to be implemented immediately.
In contrast, the high-probability Lucas model implied less adverse consequences if the recom-
mendations of the Samuelson-Solow or Solow-Tobin models were allowed to prevail. So the
Cogley and Sargent story is that the Lucas model's policy recommendation did not prevail
in the 1970s because there remained a low probability that it would be disastrous. In order
for a low-ination recommendation to emerge from the Phelps problem, the estimated coef-
cients in the Samuelson-Solow and Solow-Tobin models had to adjust in ways that would
moderate the consequences of a low-ination policy. That happened by the mid 1980s.40
The direction-of-t issue discussed by King and Watson (1994) helps explain how some
of Primiceri's results relate to Cogley and Sargent's. Both models emphasize how monetary
policy changed as the authorities updated their estimates, and Primiceri also attributes the
40The data also indicate that Bayes' law sponsors comebacks for the Samuelson-Solow and Solow-Tobin
models in the 1980s and 1990s. One reaction that a true believer in the Lucas model might have is that
Bayes' law is just too forgiving in still putting positive probability on those other models after the early 1970s
data had come in, and that the ination problem of the 1970s would have been solved by driving a stake
through those other models. But no one has the authority to drive stakes through models, and models with
operating characteristics much like those two survive today. The dispute between the fallacious (according
to Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 191)) real bills doctrine and the quantity theory of money is mottled
with repeated episodes having one of these doctrines being disposed of in favor of the other, then the other
making a comeback. The real bills doctrine rides high in times like these when the Fed pegs a short term
interest rate.
31ination of the 1970s to the high perceived sacrice ratio that Keynesian Phillips curve mod-
els presented to policy makers. But Primiceri assumes that the Fed relied exclusively on a
version of the Solow-Tobin model and is silent about why the Fed disregarded the recom-
mendations of the Lucas model. The central element of his story { the high perceived cost
of disination or sacrice ratio { is not a robust feature across the three submodels used
by Cogley and Sargent because it depends critically on the direction of t, as documented
by Cogley and Sargent (2005, p. 546-547). The sacrice ratios dier so much across sub-
models because of how the submodels interpret the diminished, near-zero contemporaneous
covariance between ination and unemployment that had emerged by the mid 1970s. In a
Keynesian Phillips curve, this diminished covariance attens the short-term tradeo, mak-
ing the authorities believe that a long spell of high unemployment would be needed to bring
ination down, prompting Keynesian modelers to be less inclined to disinate. But for a
classical Phillips curve, the shift toward a zero covariance steepens the short-term tradeo,
making the authorities believe that ination could be reduced at less cost in terms of higher
unemployment. Thus, a classically-oriented policy maker was more inclined to disinate.
7.4 Lessons about ination targeting
Each of our stories about post WWII U.S. ination features a government loss function that
weighs both unemployment and ination, thereby taking seriously the \dual mandate" that
the Full Employment Act of 1946 and the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of
1978 (Humphrey-Hawkins) convey to the Fed. If they had assumed that the government
one-period loss function is 2 instead of (U2 + 2),41then none of our stories could get o
the ground. Despite the dierent imperfections in the approximating models they attribute
to the monetary authority, all of the models would have the monetary authority always
set target ination to zero and be indierent to the accompanying unemployment outcome.
Each of our three stories thus contains a justication for ination targeting as a device that
41Or Primiceri's loss function (t   )2 + (ut   k^ uN
t )2.
32compensates for model misspecication.42
Ination-unemployment outcomes after WWII have caused many countries to adjust
what they expect from monetary policy by mandating ination targeting. That partly
reects extensive cross-country copying and partly a widespread belief that monetary au-
thorities don't have good enough models to do more. When we asked for more, we usually
got less.
8 Concluding remarks
It is easy to agree with a warning by Sims (1980) that leaving the rational expectations
equilibrium concept sends us into a \wilderness" because there is such a bewildering variety
of ways to imagine discrepancies between objective and subjective distributions.43 For this
reason, relative to some models of learning in games (see appendix A), the adaptive models
described in this paper are cautious modications of rational expectations theories and ra-
tional expectations econometrics by virtue of the ways that we allow our adaptive agents to
use economic theory, statistics, and dynamic programming. The timidity of my departure
from rational expectations reects a desire to retain the discipline of rational expectations
econometrics. I have focused on some of the things that can happen when a government
solves an intelligent design problem with a misspecied model. I view the very simple statis-
tical models in section 7 as parables that capture the situation that we are always in, namely,
that our probability models are misspecied.44 By stressing the possibility that learning has
propelled us to a self-conrming equilibrium in which the government chooses an optimal
policy based on a wrong model, the learning literature changes how we should think about
42Here the reason for assigning an ination target to the monetary authority is to prevent it from doing
what it might want to do because it has a misspecied model, in contrast to the reasoning of Rogo (1985),
in which the justication for strategic delegation is to prevent a monetary authority from doing what it is
tempted to do when it has a correct model but a timing protocol that presents temptations to deviate from
superior policies that could be attained under a timing protocol that enables it to precommit.
43There is an innite number of ways to be wrong, but only one way to be correct.
44This is the starting point of calibration in macroeconomics, i.e., the refusal to use maximum likelihood
because the model builder views it as an approximation.
33generating the novel data sets and policies that will allow misguided governments to break
out of the lack-of-experimentation traps to which self-conrming equilibria conne them.
It is also easy to admire the spirit of the quote from Ricardo. It conveys respect for the
struggles of our predecessors and the monetary institutions that they created, and condence
that, armed with new models and technologies, we can do better.
34Appendixes
A Learning in games
In a game, a Nash equilibrium is the natural counterpart of a rational expectations equi-
librium or a recursive competitive equilibrium. An extensive literature studies whether a
system of adaptive players converges to a Nash equilibrium. A range of plausible adaptive
algorithms has been proposed that are dierentiated by how much foresight and theorizing
they attribute to the players.45 At one extreme are adaptive models that have naive players
who ignore strategic interactions and either play against histograms of their opponents past
actions (ctitious play) or alter their moves in directions that ex post reduce their regret
from not having taken other actions in the past, given their opponents' histories of actions.
At the other extreme are models in which players construct statistical theories about their
opponents' behavior, use them for a while to make forward-looking decisions, occasionally
subject their theories to hypothesis tests, discard rejected ones and choose new specications.
This literature has sought plausible and robust algorithms that converge to a Nash equi-
librium. Hart and Mas-Colell say that this is a tall order:
It is notoriously dicult to formulate sensible adaptive dynamics that guarantee
convergence to Nash equilibrium. In fact, short of variants of exhaustive search
(deterministic or stochastic), there are no general results. Hart and Mas-Colell
(2003, p. 1830)
Hart and Mas-Colell and Foster and Vohra (1999) show that the source of the diculty is
that most adaptive schemes specify that adjustments in a player's strategy do not depend
on other players' payo functions, an uncoupling of the dynamics that in general prevents
the system from converging to a Nash equilibrium. Many examples of the adaptive schemes
in the literature are uncoupled. Because many game theorists nd uncoupled schemes de-
sirable, parts of the literature have lowered the bar by looking for convergence to something
weaker than Nash equilibria, namely, correlated equilibria or coarse correlated equilibria.
Hart and Mas-Colell (2003, p. 1834) observed that \It is thus interesting that Nash equilib-
rium, a notion that does not predicate coordinated behavior, cannot be guaranteed to be
reached in an uncoupled way, while correlated equilibrium, a notion based on coordination,
can."46
Hart and Mas-Colell (2000, 2001, 2003) study adaptive schemes that are backward look-
ing. For example, some of the most interesting ones have a player construct counterfactual
historical payos that he would have received had he played other strategies, then compute
a measure of regret, then adjust future play in directions that would have minimized regret.
These schemes impute little or no theorizing and foresight to the players.
45For a critical survey of this literature, see Young (2004).
46Experimental economics has supplied data sets designed to check ideas from the literature on adaptive
learning in games. Laboratory experiments using macroeconomics are rarer than those using microeconomics.
See Duy (2006) for an account of the existing experiments. I suspect that the main reason for fewer
experiments in macro than in micro is that the choices confronting articial agents within even one of the
simpler recursive competitive equilibria used in macroeconomics are very complicated relative to the settings
with which experimentalists usually confront subjects.
35For my present purposes, one of the most interesting contributions comes from part
of the literature that attributes more sophistication to players, in particular, the work of
Foster and Young (2003), which is also summarized in Young (2004, ch. 8).47 Their model
has the following components: (1) each player has a large set of potential models that describe
his opponents' strategies; (2) players use a random device to select a particular model; (3)
after that model is selected, there is an `act-and-collect-data' period during which a player
(incorrectly) assumes that he will believe his current model forever; during this period,
each player chooses his actions via a smoothed best response to what his model tells him
about opponents' actions (e.g., a quantal response function); (4) after a data collection
period, a player compares the empirical pattern of his opponents' play with that predicted
by his model. He performs an hypothesis test that compares the theoretical and empirical
distributions. If he rejects his current model, he randomly draws a new model from his set
of models, then returns to step 2. If he accepts the model, he returns to step 3, waits a
random number of periods, and then begins another data collection period.
With suitable assumptions about the lengths of testing periods and the tolerances of the
hypothesis tests, Foster and Young (2003) show that behaviors eventually emerge that are
often close to Nash equilibria. Their notion of hypothesis tests is suciently broad to include
many plausible procedures. Their convergence result seems to be an uncoupled multi-agent
learning scheme that actually approaches Nash equilibria, not something weaker like the
coarse correlated equilibrium that the entirely backward-looking schemes mentioned above
can approach. They avoid the conundrum of Hart and Mas-Colell partly by weakening the
notion of convergence.
B From commodity to at money
A long process led to the ideas in the opening quote from David Ricardo, which in time led
Keynes and others to propose a at currency.
B.1 Learning to supplement a commodity currency with tokens
Redish (1990, 2000) and Sargent and Velde (2002) described how it took 800 years to un-
derstand and cope with two imperfections that marred an ideal self-regulating commodity
money system in which coins of all denominations were meant to exchange at values propor-
tional to their silver (or gold) content. In the ideal system, a government instructed a mint
to oer to sell coins of dierent denominations for precious metal at prices proportional to
their weights in precious metal. The mint did not buy coins for metal, but citizens were free
to melt precious metal coins to recover precious metal. If minting and melting were costless,
this self-regulating system would automatically adjust the denomination structure of coins to
suit coin holders' preferences by letting them melt coins of a denomination they wanted less
of, then take the metal to the mint to buy coins of the denomination they wanted.48 In the
47For a distinct but related approach, see Jehiel (1995, 1998). The Foster and Young (2003) model seems
to me to capture some of the avor of the anticipated utility framework advocated by Kreps (1998). The
classier models in Marimon et al. (1990) have a similar avor.
48Sargent and Velde (2002, p. 95) cited Bernando Davanzati, who in 1588 wrote that \metal should be
worth as much in bullion as in coin, and be able to change from metal to money and money to metal without
36ideal system, a metal melt point equaled a metal mint point, denomination by denomination.
In practice, two imperfections hampered this system: (1) it was costly to produce coins;
and (2) coins depreciated through wear and tear and sweating and clipping. The rst
imperfection gave rise to nonempty intervals between melt and mint points for gold or silver
coins of each denomination { an upper point that indicated a melting point for that coin and
a lower one that prompted minting. The proportionate spreads between minting and melting
points diered because as a fraction of the value of the coin, it was cheaper to produce a
large denomination coin than a small denomination coin. Unless the government were to
subsidize the mint for producing low denomination coins, the spread between minting and
melting points would be proportionately wider for low denomination coins. The second
imperfection allowed underweight coins to circulate along side full weight coins.
A nonempty interval between melting and minting points allowed coins to circulate by
tale (i.e., by what is written on the coin rather than by weight) at an exchange value that
exceeded their value by weight. Indeed, in the presence of costs of producing coins, the
money supply mechanism provided incentives for people to purchase new coins from the
mint only when their value in exchange exceeded their value by weight by enough to cover
the mint's brassage and seigniorage fees (Smith 1789, Book I, ch. 5).
Nonempty intervals with proportionately wider widths for lower denomination coins and
a consequent exchange rate indeterminacy allowed the intervals to shift over time and even-
tually to become so misaligned that they recurrently provided incentives to melt small de-
nomination coins. That created the recurring shortages of small coins documented by Cipolla
(1956, 1982).49
Cipolla (1956) described a temporary practical remedy for these shortages. The au-
thorities debased small denomination coins, thereby shifting their mint-melt intervals in a
direction that motivated citizens to purchase new coins from the mint. Monetary authorities
throughout Europe used this method for hundreds of years. There were repeated debase-
ments in small denomination silver coins and secular declines in rates of exchange of small
denomination for large denomination coins.
Many experiments, some inadvertent, others purposeful, were performed, and numerous
theoretical tracts were written and disputed before what Cipolla (1956) called the `standard
formula' for issuing token small denomination coins was put into practice in the mid 19th
century.50 It solved the problem of misaligned mint-melt intervals for coins of dierent de-
nominations by, rst, having only one large denomination full weight coin that the mint sold
for a precious metal, and, second, having the government issue dicult-to-counterfeit small
denomination token coins that it promised to convert on demand into the large denomination
coin. This required a technology for manufacturing coins that were dicult to counterfeit.51
As examples of inadvertent experiments, token monies were occasionally issued inside
besieged cities and sometimes they worked. A document that anticipated ideas of John
Law, Adam Smith, and David Ricardo sparked a purposeful experiment. It advised King
loss, like an amphibious animal."
49This multi-interval commodity money system in which coins circulate by tale is taken for granted by
Smith (1789, book I, ch. 5).
50This process of shuttling through experiments, reformulations of theories, and further experiments re-
minds me of the hypothesis-testing learning models of Foster and Young (2003) and Cho and Kasa (2006).
51See Redish (1990, 2000) and Selgin (2003).
37Ferdinand II of Spain that he could issue token copper coins that Spanish residents would
voluntarily accept from the government in exchange for full-bodied silver coins. It described
how this scal boon to the Spanish treasury could be attained in a noninationary way.52
Three successive Spanish Kings tried this experiment, which had all of the ingredients of the
19th century standard formula except convertibility. For 25 years, the experiment worked
well, yielding the government substantial revenues without ination. But eventually exces-
sive issues of copper coins caused ination, in the aftermath of which the Spanish monetary
authorities pursued a fascinating sequence of experiments. They repeatedly restamped cop-
per coins and manipulated the unit of account in order either to adjust the price level or
raise revenues for the Spanish government.
The quantity theory can operate only in the limited interval between the mint and melt
points for a precious metal, so a commodity money system conceals the quantity theory.
When the Spanish broke through those restrictions, they gave the British statistician Sir
William Petty data that he used to discover a quantity theory of money (see Hull (1899)).
Other episodes created more data that further substantiated the quantity theory of money,
for example, the construction and collapse of John Law's system (see Velde (2007)) and the
overissuing of French assignats after the sales of the church lands that had initially backed
them were suspended when war broke out in 1792 (see Sargent and Velde (1995)). But the
same episodes that lent vivid empirical support to a quantity theory also brought evidence
that government monetary authorities could not be trusted to administer a pure at standard
in ways that stabilized prices.53
In 1660, the master of the British mint, Henry Slingsby, added an element missing from
the Spanish experiment, namely, convertibility of token coins, and recommended what in
the 19th century became the standard formula.54 But perhaps because the ination accom-
panying the Spanish and similar experiments had given token coins a bad name, the British
government ignored Slingsby's recommendations. Many experts, including Locke (1691),
continued to insist that token coins of any denomination were dangerous and that a good
faith commodity money system required that coins of all denominations be full bodied. For
a long time, that sentiment convinced national governments not to issue tokens, but other
entities created them. In seventeenth and eighteenth century Britain, hundreds of private
rms and municipalities issued small denomination tokens that formed a substantial part
of the country's coinage. Between 1816 and 1836, the British government implemented the
standard formula by nationalizing a token coin industry that had long existed.
B.2 Ricardo's proposal
It required 156 years to take the short logical step from Slingsby's 1660 standard formula for
issuing convertible token subsidiary coins to David Ricardo's 1816 recommendation. Ricardo
proposed that a country's domestic money supply should ideally consist of paper notes that
52See the document cited in Sargent and Velde (2002, pp. 231-232).
53I suspect that is why later advocates for replacing the gold standard with `more scientic' systems of
managed currencies including Adam Smith and Ricardo to Keynes purposefully omitted references to some
of the historical experiments that generated the data that were sources for the quantity theory of money. For
example, Smith (1789) did not cite John Law's theoretical writings as among the sources for his monetary
recommendations.
54See Sargent and Velde (2002, pp. 268-269).
38the government promises to exchange at a pegged price for gold bullion bars, but that no
gold coins should actually be minted. A variant of Ricardo's scheme in which a government
promises to redeem domestic notes for gold, but only for foreign residents, came to be
practiced around 1900. This arrangement, by which \a cheap local currency [is] articially
maintained at par with the international standard of value," (Keynes 1913, p. 25) was called
the \gold exchange standard." Keynes described how by 1913 this system had come to prevail
in India through a sequence of haphazard administrative decisions that eventually produced
a coherent system that no one had planned but that Keynes applauded. Keynes (1913, p. 25)
predicted that Ricardo's scheme would be an essential part of \the ideal currency system of
the future."55
The standard formula eliminates the gold or silver points for all but one standard coin,
uses the mint and melt points for that coin to regulate the total quantity of money, and
promises freely to convert tokens into that standard coin in order to produce the correct
denomination composition. It was one more step from the standard formula or Ricardo's
proposal to the recommendation of Fisher (1920), Keynes, and others that well intentioned
government ocials, not the mint and melt points for a standard coin, should regulate the
supply of money. Discovering the quantity theory of money was an essential step in learning
the conditions under which a at money system could be managed to provide greater price
level stability than could be achieved with a gold standard.
As Keynes wanted, in the twentieth century governments throughout the world carried
out the historically unprecedented experiment of managing currencies completely cut o
from gold backing (see Friedman (1991, p. 245)). Figure 5 documents that, at least until
very recently, the monetary authorities in four hard-currency countries failed to deliver the
kind of price stability that a commodity standard had achieved. There was much more
ination in many other countries.
C A monetary policy rules literature
The adaptive models described in section 7 explain the rise and fall of post WWII U.S.
ination in terms of monetary policy rules that drifted in response to drifts in the monetary
authorities' models of the economy. All three models embed very crude descriptions of
the monetary policy rules and sidestep many interesting questions about monetary policy
transmission mechanisms. It is appropriate to say a few words about a related literature
that uses time series data to infer the structure of post WWII U.S. monetary policy rules
and how they have changed over time. The bottom line is that this literature has mixed
evidence about whether monetary policy rules shifted enough to validate stories along the
55Speaking of how a change in Indians' preferences for holding gold could cause world-wide ination in
prices:
The time may not be far distant when Europe, having perfected her mechanism of exchange
on the basis of a gold standard, will nd it possible to regulate her standard of value on a more
rational and stable basis. It is not likely that we shall leave permanently the most intimate
adjustments of our economic organism at the mercy of a lucky prospector, a new chemical
process, or a change of ideas [preferences for holding gold] in Asia. (Keynes 1913, p. 71)
39Figure 5: Indices of prices in terms of unit of account in England, the United States, France, and
Spain. Sargent and Velde (2002, p. 35)
lines of our three adaptive models.56
Bernanke and Mihov (1998) developed an SVAR methodology for measuring innovations
in monetary policy and their macroeconomic eects. They compared alternative ways of
measuring monetary policy shocks and derived a new measure of policy innovations based
on possibly time-varying estimates of the Fed's operating procedures. They presented a
measure of the overall stance of policy (see Bernanke and Mihov (1998, Fig. III, p. 899))
that is striking in how the distribution of tight and loose policies seems not to have changed
much in the periods before and after 1980.
But Clarida et al. (2000) estimated a forward-looking monetary policy reaction function
for the postwar United States economy before and after Volcker's appointment as Fed Chair-
man in 1979 and found substantial dierences across periods. They found that interest rate
policy in the Volcker-Greenspan period has been much more sensitive to changes in expected
ination than in the pre-Volcker period. They then extracted implications of the estimated
rules for the equilibrium properties of ination and output in a new Keynesian DSGE model
and showed that the Volcker-Greenspan rule is stabilizing, but that the earlier rule was not.
Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) estimated a new Keynesian model like Clarida et al.'s in which
the equilibrium is undetermined if monetary policy is passive. They constructed posterior
weights for the determinacy and indeterminacy region of the parameter space as well as
estimates for the propagation of fundamental and sunspot shocks. They found that U.S.
monetary policy after 1982 was consistent with determinacy but that the pre-Volcker policy
was not, and also that before 1979 indeterminacy substantially altered the propagation of
56This mixed news partly reects the fact that it is statistically dicult to detect drifts or shifts in the
systematic part of a vector autoregression and much easier to detect changes in volatilities.
40shocks.
In contrast, working in terms of less completely interpreted models, Sims and Zha (2006)
estimated a multivariate regime-switching model for monetary policy and found that the best
t allows time variation in disturbance variances only. When they permitted the systematic
VAR coecients to change, the best t was with change only in the monetary policy rule.
They estimated three regimes that correspond to periods across which the folk-wisdom states
that monetary policy diered. But they found that those dierences among regimes were
not large enough to account for the rise and decline of ination of the 1970s and 1980s.
Likewise, by estimating a time-varying VAR with stochastic volatility, Primiceri (2005) found
that both the systematic and non-systematic components of monetary policy had changed.
In particular, he found that the systematic responses of the interest rate to ination and
unemployment exhibited a trend toward more aggressive behavior, while also having sizeable
high frequency oscillations. But Primiceri concluded that those had small eects on the rest
of the economy and that exogenous non-policy shocks were more important than interest
rate policy in explaining the U.S. ination and unemployment episodes of the 1970's, thus
coming down more on the `bad luck' than the `bad policies' side of the argument. I hope
that conclusion is too pessimistic because we have learned to do better.
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